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Abstract 
Recent scholarship has suggested that nation-states will gradually fade away in 
favor of regions and super-regions as the main actors within a European Union 
characterized by strong regional identities. At the same time, recent developments have 
shown that citizen support for European integration is essential for any future 
development of the Union. The puzzle inspiring this paper is the finding that the greatest 
support for the EU increasingly stems from minority nationalist regions seeking to bypass 
their central states to achieve their policy goals at the EU level. This paper empirically 
tests this suggestion, while shedding light on the relationship between the quality of 
representation of regional interests at the EU level and positive citizen attitudes towards 
the EU. In particular, it finds two explanations for cross-regional variation in the 
relationship between Euroskepticism and representation: (1) a cultural explanation, 
embodied by a difference in the nature and quality of representation between regions that 
are linguistically distinctive and regions that are not; and (2) an institutional explanation, 
embodied by a difference in the nature and quality of representation between regions 
from federal and non-federal member states. The paper uses an eclectic methodological 
approach, first utilizing multivariate regression analysis, estimating logistic and ordinal 
logit models that help explain variation in Euroskepticism at the regional level. The 
results are then complemented by the findings of in-depth elite interviews of regional 
representatives-more specifically the directors of a selection of the many regional 
information offices present in Brussels. This paper takes the study ofEuroskepticism to a 
new level, as most previous scholarly work has focused on explanations at the individual 
or at the member state level. At the same time it strengthens the notion of a growing 
importance of a "Europe of the regions." 

Introduction 
After half a century of formal integration, Europe remains an amalgam of multinational states. 
From Scotland to Wales, Catalonia to Corsica, and Flanders to Brittany, strong regional and 
ethnoterritorial identities seek greater voice, greater resources, and greater autonomy- if not 
outright independence and statehood. Given the rise in regional assertiveness, it is no surprise 
that interest and speculation in a 'Europe of the Regions' has grown. In brief, the nowcfamiliar 
suggestion is that nation-states will fade away in favor of regions and super-regions that can 
survive and thrive within the EU and in the global economy. This vision is reinforced by the 
increasing tendency of both the EU and the regions to try to by-pass the central state. 
(Downs 2002, 172) 
Today a number of paradoxes characterize the European Union (EU). First, one can 
observe the trend of a simultaneously centralizing and decentralizing EU, with power shifting 
vertically from the member states to the EU level, and from the EU level to the regional level. 
Second, there are contradicting trends of Euroskepticism and Europhoria, both among and within 
EU member states. Third, one can observe contradicting trends of state nationalism characterized 
by Euroskepticism and xenophobia, and minority nationalism characterized by Europhoria and 
openness, can be observed (Keating 2001). Fourth, there is a trend of diminishing focus on 
sovereignty among regions and ethnoterritorial minorities, breaking the traditional linkage 
between nationalism/regionalism and protectionism (Keating 1996). Fifth, an increased emphasis 
on minority protection initiated at the EU-level is occurring, often contradicting state level 
policies. 
What these five paradoxes and contradictions have in common is that they involve a new 
political mobilization of regions and regional minority nationalisms at the EU level. This leads 
one to the greatest paradox of all: the suggestion that the populations in minority nationalist 
territories are among the most positive toward European integration, in most cases more positive 
than their majority compatriots. In 2005 and 2008 it became clearer than ever-following the 
referenda in France and the Netherlands on the ratification of the European Constitution, and the 

referendum in Ireland on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, leading to the failure thereof-that 
any further integration of Europe is heavily contingent on public support for the EU project. 
Subsequently, these trends underscore the vast practical value of analyzing the puzzle ofEU 
support among regional minority nationalisms. 
Inspired by this puzzle, the purpose of this paper is to seek a basic explanation to the 
variation in attitudes toward European integration at the sub-national, or regional level, by 
empirically answering the following questions: Is there greater support for E~ropean integration 
in regions dominated by minority nationalisms than in other regions within and across the EU 
member states? Is there greater support for European integration at the regional level in federal 
member states or in unitary member states? Finally, can variation in support for European 
integration at the sub-national level be explained by variation in the quality of representation of 
regional interests in Brussels? I thus seek to establish whether a cultural explanation, embodied 
by the question of different levels regional identity, or an institutional explanation, embodied by 
the question of established sub-national institutions as agents of regional mobilization, or a 
combination thereof, is more viable in explaining Euroskepticism. 
Research on European integration and the development of the EU has traditionally fallen 
under the umbrella of studies in international relations, treating the EU mainly as an international 
organization (Slocum and van Langenhove 2004). Pursuant to deeper European integration and a 
recent wave of regional integration, the popularity of social constructivism in the scientific study 
of regional integration has increased, as has the tendency to look upon the EU as a single polity 
(Downs 2002; Hettne 2002; Keating, Loughlin, and Deschouwer 2003; Loughlin 2001; Risse 
2004; Slocum and van Langenhove 2004). In recent years the EU has transformed into a political 
hybrid without a contemporary or historical equivalent, inspiring scholars in various academic 
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fields to question the relationship between nation and state, centralization and decentralization, 
and even the existence of the nation-state itself in a future Europe (Biersteker 1999; Guibernau 
1999; Keating 2001; Keating, Loughlin, and Deschouwer 2003). Montserrat Guibernau looks 
upon the EU as "a living laboratory in which experiments about new ways to understand 
sovereignty, territoriality and identity are currently being tested" (Guibernau 1999, 149). These 
words illustrate the essence of the difficulty and delight of studying the EU today: the field is at 
an intersection where a number of academic disciplines, literatures, and themes meet, interact, 
and engage in numerous theoretical debates. The research questions of this paper are placed 
squarely in this intersection, and thus operate on the border of a number of different literatures. 
The connection between public approval of government institutions and democratic 
legitimacy has long been established by political scientists. At the same time, scholars argue that 
adequate democratic representation of EU citizens at all levels is of fundamental importance for 
the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Schmidt 2004, Thomassen and Schmitt 1997). Not 
surprisingly, given its effect of slowing down the pace of European integration in recent years, 
the study of public attitudes toward European integration-and in particular the phenomenon 
referred to as Euroskepticism-has received a lot of scholarly attention. 1 Multiple studies 
confirm that the level of public support for the EU varies both within and among member states, 
but most scholarly work has focused on explanations at the individual or at the member state 
level. This paper thus first and foremost makes a contribution to the scholarly literature on 
Euroskepticism, as it finds evidence of systematic variation in public attitudes toward European 
integration at a level that has largely been overlooked in the member state and individual level 
analyses conducted by scholars so far. 
1 See for example Issue 8:1 (2007) of the Journal European Union Politics, which was entirely devoted to the 
subject. 
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In addition, as sub-national regions have resumed an increasingly important role in the 
EU governance system in recent years, the research questions can be placed within a large 
literature on European integration in general, and within a growing scholarly literature on what 
has been labeled a "Europe of the Regions" in particular. Whereas the concept of a Europe of the 
Regions dates back to the 1920s, it resurged in the 1960s as a way to promote a federal Europe. 
More recently the importance of the regional level of governance within the EU has increased 
since the early 1990s, when the regions were given a consulting role in the decision making 
process through the creation of the Committee of the Regions and through the introduction of the 
principle ofsubsidiarity (Treaty on European Union 1992). Recent scholarship has emphasized 
the role of regional elite mobilization in Brussels as a political tool of achieving change, as the 
number of regional information offices in Brussels has continued to increase drastically, 
doubling in size from 140 in1995 to over 280 in 2007 (CoR 2007; Mamadouh 2001; Marks et al. 
1996, Moo re 2007). It thus appears likely that regions of all kinds, whether or not they are 
granted any greater political influence through direct incorporation in the EU decision-making 
process in the near future, will continue to attempt influencing this process in alternative ways. 
This is likely to spur another wave of research on regionalism in the EU. This surge in 
decentralization and regional integration has given rise to a whole literature on what has been 
named the "new regionalism" (Hettne 2002; Keating 1998). Although the new regionalism is 
seen as a world-wide phenomenon, nowhere else has regionalization been as extensive as in 
Europe, which has consequently come to serve as a paradigm for this concept (Hettne 2002; 
Keating 2004). The new regionalism literature stresses the importance of local and regional 
levels for economic development and change, but also the social construction of the region, and 
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the role of collective identities in facilitating social change (Keating 1998, 2004; Keating, 
Loughlin, and Deschouwer 2003). 
The new regionalists' emphasis on the role of identity implicates an overlap with the 
ethnicity and national identity literatures within comparative politics. The question of regional 
minority nationalism-the main inspiration for this paper-is located where these literatures 
intersect. One scholar in particular, Michael Keating, has dominated the minority nationalism 
literature (Keating 1988, 1996, 1998,2001, 2004; Keating and Hooghe 2001; Keating, Loughlin, 
and Deschouwer 2003; Keating and McGarry 2001). He defines minority nationalism as 
involving "the denial of exclusive claims on the part of the state nationalism and the assertion of 
national rights of self determination for groups within it" (Keating 1996, 18). Keating initiated 
the theoretically and empirically useful distinction between ethnic and civic minority nationalism 
(Brubaker 2004; Keating 1996; Newman 2000). Finally, he coined the term "New Minority 
Nationalisms," also called regional nationalisms, as "post-nation-state in inspiration, addressing 
a world in which sovereignty has ceased to be absolute and power is dispersed" (Keating 1996, 
53). 
One of the main theses in the minority nationalism literature is thus that European 
regions, especially those harboring strong regional identities, have shifted from being 
traditionally protectionist to being among the greatest proponents of European integration. 
Keating's writings constitute the most immediate theoretical basis and inspiration for this 
analysis, and the hypotheses are largely framed and formulated within this context. Though 
Keating's work is largely qualitative, this analysis will utilize both quantitative and qualitative 
methodology to add knowledge about why minority nationalisms have a more positive attitude 
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toward European integration than their nonminority compatriots. Although many scholars have 
identified the phenomenon, no one to date has conducted such a quantitative empirical analysis. 
Based on the above research questions, and supported by findings in the scholarly 
literature on the new regionalism and minority nationalism in the EU, I will test the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis I: The stronger an individual's regional identity is, the greater the likelihood of 
supporting European integration, all else being equal. 
The logic behind the first hypothesis, and thus behind the main research question, is 
broad agreement in recent scholarly literature on regionalism and minority nationalism in the 
EU, agreement that a deepened European integration has provided incentives to minority 
nationalist and regionalist groups to rethink their policy stance on European integration, 
switching from a protectionist, anti-European position to an outward-looking, pro-European 
position, thus seeking to bypass their states, to achieve their policy goals at the EU level (Downs 
2002; Keating 1996, 2004). In their article on party response to European integration, Gary 
Marks and Carole Wilson build on the cleavage theory ofLipset and Rokkan and extend their 
center-periphery dimension with a distinction between territorially dispersed and territorially 
concentrated peripheral minorities (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Keating 1988; Marks and Wilson 
2000). They argue that political parties representing the former are likely to oppose all central 
authorities, whereas political parties representing the latter tend to support European integration 
because it "can facilitate decentralization of authority from the central state to their region or 
ethno-territorial nation" (Marks and Wilson 2000, 438). Based on this, one might expect that the 
existence of a minority nationalist or regionalist party will lead to a more positive attitude toward 
European integration. Thus a positive relationship between the dependent variable, support for 
European integration; and the first independent variable of interest, regional minority nationalism 
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status is assumed, expecting a greater support for European integration in regions dominated by 
minority nationalisms than in other regions. 
Hypothesis 2: Support for European integration is more likely in federal member states than in 
unitary member states, all else being equal. 
The literature has indicated a positive relationship between attitudes toward the EU and a 
federal type of government. Some scholars hypothesize that regions resembling federal units 
tend to be more positive toward the EU because they have the institutional means in place to 
represent their interests within the complex European governance structure (Bullman 200 I). 
Thus, based on existing research, the third independent variable of interest, federalism, is 
assumed to have a positive relationship with the dependent variable. 
Hypothesis 3: Support for European integration is stronger in regions whose interests are better 
represented at the EU level. 
There is obviously a very large literature on political representation, and the 
representation of regional interests in the European Union has most conunonly been analyzed 
within the theoretical context of pluralism and lobbying, much because the lack of formal, direct 
representation of regions within the institutional structure of the EU has resulted in the use of 
informal ways to influence EU policy (Hooghe 1995; Keating 2001; Keating and Hooghe 2001; 
Mamadouh 2001; Marks, Haesly, and Mbaye 2002; Marks et al. 1996; Nielsen and Salk 1998). 
The quantitative part of the analysis, testing the first two hypotheses, uses cross-sectional 
individual and aggregate level survey data, collected through Eurobarometer survey 65.2 (EB 
65.2) between March and May 2006 (Papacostas). The data is unique both in its scope and in its 
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characteristics, as 29,170 citizens from all EU member-states and the candidate states are 
interviewed in face-to-face interviews. The population universe for the surveys was all persons 
aged 15 and over, and the samples of all surveys were designed as multi-stage probability 
samples in the single countries. The fact that identical surveys were simultaneously conducted in 
all EU member-states vastly increases the comparability of the data across member-states. 
Moreover, the fact that each individual interviewed was not only coded on the country in which 
the interview took place, but also on the region in which the interview was conducted, makes the 
data extraordinarily useful for the purposes of this analysis. In addition to this, the datasets have 
been widely used in scholarly analysis since their release.2 After dropping all interviews with 
respondents outside the EU 15, and a small number of respondents who were not coded on the 
variable "region," a total of 15,403 individuals remained in the analysis sample. Further, data 
was missing on one or more of the variables included in this analysis for additional respondents, 
which were consequently dropped from the analysis sample. The final analysis samples for each 
of the dependent variables were additionally reduced to 14,704, 14,839, and 13,131, 
. 1 3 respective y. 
To attempt to explain the variation in Euroskepticism at the regional level that is tested in 
the first two hypotheses, and consequently to test the third hypothesis-that support for 
European integration is stronger in regions whose interests are better represented at the EU 
level-a qualitative component was added to the analysis. To control for both variation caused 
by institutional factors and by cultural factors, the quality of repr~sentation was evaluated by 
examining the activities and goals of a number of sub-national representation offices in Brussels. 
2 For more details about the Eurobarometer Surveys, see the survey code books and documentation, available 
through the web site of the Inter-university Consortium for-Political and Social Research (ICPSR), at 
htto:/ /www .icpsr. umich.edu/. 
3 The cleaning process is summarized in Appendix A. 
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To capture differences between federal and unitary member states, on one hand, and between 
strong identity (minority nationalist) regions and weak identity regions, on the other hand, cases 
were selected that reflect both these dimensions. Between May I and June 11, 2008, forty face-
to-face interviews were conducted with the directors (in a few cases deputy directors) of the 
regional representation offices from three member states: Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
Sweden4 The interviews were conducted in the native languages of the interviewees, they lasted 
between 34 and 90 minutes (with an average length of just under one hour), and with only two of 
the 42 existent regional offices from the selected member states declining an interview, the 
response rate was very high5 Due to the limited scope of this paper, however, only a select 
number of interviews have been analyzed, and thus only preliminary findings of these interviews 
will be presented here. 
Methodology 
For the first part of the paper, the use of quantitative methodology, particularly regression 
analysis, was especially suitable, considering the nature of the data used in this analysis: large-
scale survey data representing the populations of all EU member states. Also, since the previous 
use of multivariate regression analysis in the research on the topic of this paper has been limited, 
such analysis may lead to insights that would otherwise be lost. To test the first two hypotheses 
described above, and to answer the research questions of this paper, the independent variables 
were regressed on each of the three dependent variables. In the case of the first two dependent 
variables-satisfaction with EU membership, and EU image-(here called SatEUMem and 
EUimage respectively) I estimated ordinallogit models, and in the case of the third dependent 
4 The interview questionnaire can be found in Appendix D. 
5 The director of one UK regional office did not want to participate, and another interview with a UK regional office 
director was cancelled due to personnel change. 
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variable-relative satisfaction with EU democracy--(here called SatEUDem) I estimated a 
logistic model6 
The three regression equations to be estimated can be summarized in the following 
. 7 
equatiOn: 
Y; ~ Po + P1federalism; + P2regionallD;+ P3representation; + P4minorityregion; + 
P5minorityxregionaliD; + p6male; + p7age; + Pseducation; + e; 
where 
Y 1 ~ Assessment of own country's membership in the EU as a "generally 
good thing," a "neither good nor bad thing," or a "bad thing" (2, I ,0) 
Y 2 ~ Assessment of whether the EU conjures up a "very positive," a "fairly 
positive," a "neutral," a "fairly negative," or a "very negative" image (scale: 
4 ~ very positive to 0 ~ very negative) 
Y 3 ~ Relative satisfaction with how democracy works in the EU compared 
to own country, coded one if satisfaction with democracy in the EU is greater 
than satisfaction with democracy in one's own country, and zero otherwise 
federalism~ level of federalism, coded on an index ranging from 10 c~ most federal) to 0 
c~ least federal) 
regional ID~ regional identity, coded one if the respondent is more attached to their region 
than to their country, and zero otherwise 
representation~ Assessment of whether or not the respondent agrees with the statement "My 
voice counts in the EU" (scale: 2 ~agrees; I ~ DK; and 0 ~disagrees) 
minority region~ region identified as predominantly minority nationalist (1,0) 
minorityxregionaliD ~interaction term between minority region and regional identity 
male~ Sex(l,O) 
age~ Age in years 
education~ Age when stopping full-time education 
6 The choice of the ordinallogit for the first two regression model is motivated by the fact that the dependent 
variable is an ordinal variable, and the choice of the logistic model for the third regression model is motivated by the 
fact that the dependent variable is a binary variable. 
7 Initially I intended to include both country and region dummy variables, but this proved to be unsuitable due to 
lack of variation. All models were tested for multicollinearity, however with negative results. 
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The construct "support for European integration," which can also be seen as the antithesis 
of Euroskepticism, is operationalized by three separate dependent variables based on three 
different questions from the EB 65.2 because they capture slightly different variations of 
respondents' attitudes toward European integration. The first question asked whether the 
respondent sees one's country's EU membership as a good thing, a bad thing, or a neither good 
nor bad thing, and answers were coded two if the respondent answered "a good thing," one if the 
respondent answered "neither good nor bad," and zero if the respondent answered "a bad thing."8 
The second question asked the respondent whether the EU conjures up a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative, or a very negative image, and the variable was re-coded to a 
five-point categorical scale ranging from 4 (very positive) to 0 (very negative). The third 
question asked, in two parts, whether the respondent was satisfied with the way democracy 
works in the EU and in one's own country. With answer options ranging from one (very 
satisfied) to four (not at all satisfied), the direction of the scale was reversed on both questions; 
then the a new binary variable was generated and coded one if the respondent was more satisfied 
with democracy in the EU than with democracy in one's own country, and zero otherwise. 
In addition to the dependent variables, the EB 65.2 was also used as a source for five 
independent variables. First, to operationalize the key independent variable "regional identity," a 
two-part question asking about the degree of attachment to one's region and to one's country was 
used to create a binary variable, coded one if the respondent reported being more attached to 
their region than to their country, and zero otherwise. Second, to operationalize the control 
variable "representation," a question asking respondents whether they agree or not with the 
statement "My voice counts in the European Union" was used to create an ordinal variable coded 
two if the respondent agreed, one if the respondent did not know, and zero if the respondent 
8 The exact wording of all survey questions can be found in Appendix C. 
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disagreed. Finally, three questions asking about the respondent's sex, age, and age when 
stopping full-time education were used to create control variables for sex, a variable for age in 
years, and a variable for education.9 
In addition to the variables based on the individual level survey data, three independent 
variables were coded at the aggregate, regional level. First, to operationalize the key independent 
variable "federalism," an ordinal variable was created that assigned different scores on a zero-to-
ten point federalism scale, based on the regional governance index used by Marks, Haesly and 
Mbaye (2002). 10 Second, a binary variable was generated, indicating whether or not a respondent 
was interviewed in a region dominated by minority nationalism. The main reason for including 
this variable in addition to the variable "regional identity" was on one hand to create a broader 
category of individuals that are likely to have a strong regional identity, and on the other hand to 
enable the inclusion of an interaction term identifying individuals who are both residents of a 
minority nationalist region, and express a strong regional identity themselves. The decision on 
whether a region should be classified as a region dominated by a minority nationalism was based 
on previous analyses of regional secessionism and minority nationalism in Europe, and carefully 
assessed in each case. This resulted in identifYing 37 of 155 regions dominated by minority 
nationalisms, dispersed among nine of the fifteen EU member states included in the analysis. 11 
9 Although I initially intended to include a variable based on the respondent's answer to a question about household 
income, I decided against this since the response rate was so low that it would have decreased my sample size by 
almost half. 
10 Marks, Haesly, and Mbaye rate each EU member state, and in cases of asymmetric federalism-such as in the UK 
and Spa in-each sub-state region, on three dimensions of federalism: constitutional federalism, the role of the 
regions in the central government, and the presence of regional elections. The methodology of this measure can be 
reviewed in its entirety in Appendix B of their 2002 article '"What Do Subnational Offices Think They Are Doing in 
Brussels?" 
11 In Austria, the regions Burgenland and Kiirnten were included due to the relatively large numbers of inhabitants in 
these regions speaking the languages of the neighboring Hungary, Croatia, and Slovenia (Cordell and Wolff2004). 
In Belgium, the Flemish regions Antwerpen, Limburg, Oost-Vlaanderen, Vlaams-Brabant, and West-VIaanderen, 
were selected, motivated by their longstanding linguistically based, autonomy-seeking movement (Hendriks 2001; 
Hooghe 1995; Laible 200 I; Lynch 1996). In Denmark, the largely German-speaking region South Denmark was 
selected (Cordell and Wolff2004). In Finland, the largely Swedish-speaking region South Finland was selected 
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Finally, to control for the presence of non-minority respondents in regions coded as minority 
nationalist regions, an interaction term was generated from the regional identity variable and the 
variable minority region. 
Results I: Cultural and Institutional Causes for Variation in Euroskepticism among Regions12 
Table I displays the effects of each of the independent variables on each of the three 
dependent variables, and based on these results, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Overall, the results of the tbree different regressions were mixed, which is somewhat surprising 
considering the fact that they were chosen to represent the same overarching construct: support 
for European integration. All key independent variables were statistically significant at least at 
tbe 5 percent level in at least two of the models, and all control variables at least at the I percent 
level in at least two of the modelsn Looking at the individual coefficients of the independent 
variables across the models, however, the results are mixed. 
First, the results suggest that respondents interviewed in member states and regions witb 
higher levels of federalism were-as expected-more likely to be satisfied with their country's 
(Cordell and Wolff2004). In France, the largely Gennan-speaking Alsace and the autonomy-seeking Bretagne were 
selected (Corde11 and Wolff2004; Lynch 1996). Tn Germany, the autonomy-seeking Bavaria, in which a number of 
regionalist parties exist, was selected (Anderson 1999; Bullman 2001; Day 1988; Gerstenlauer 1995). In Italy, the 
northern regions PiemonteNalle d'Aosta, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia/Giuha, and Emilia-Romagna 
were selected, motivated by their inclusion in the autonomy-seeking larger region Padania (Desideri 1995; Loughlin 
2001 b). Furthermore in Italy, the largely Germ an-speaking region Trentino was included, as well as the autonomy-
seeking region Sardegna (Cordell and Wolff2004). Jn Spain, the linguistically distinct regions Catalufia, Galicia, 
and Pais Vasco (the Basque country) were selected (Folch-Serra and Nogue-Font 2001; Keating 1996; Keating, 
Loughlin, and Deschouwer 2003; Morata 1995). In addition, all Spanish regions in which a regionalist political party 
was present-Andalucia, Aragon, Asturias, Baleares, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla Leon, Valencia, Extremadura, 
Navarra, and Rioja-were selected (Day 1988). Finally, in the United Kingdom, Scotland and Wales were selected, 
motivated by linguistic distinction and autonomy-seeking, and Northern Ireland was selected based on its 
characteristic as the only large-scale religious minority nationalist region in the EU (Cordell and Wolff2004; 
Keating 1996; Keating and Jones 1995; Loughlin 2001; Lynch 1996; Newman 1996; McGarry 2001; Newman 
1996). 
12 The descriptive statistics of the analysis sample can be found in Appendix B. 
13 The regressions were estimated using robust standard-errors, since several of the variables showed signs of 
heteroskedasticity in the Breusch-Pagan test. 
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EU membership than not, and more likely to be relatively more satisfied with EU democracy 
than with democracy in their home country, all else equal, and the first null hypothesis can thus 
be rejected. The practical significance of this result is minute, however, since the magnitude of 
the positive relationship is very small. Second, against expectation, respondents whose regional 
identity is stronger than the identity with their home country are less likely than others to be 
satisfied with their country's EU membership, are less likely to have a positive EU image, while 
at the same time being relatively more satisfied with EU democracy than with democracy in their 
home country, all else equal. These contradictory findings may be a result of varying reasons for 
feeling affinity towards one's region, which will be discussed below. A similar contradiction can 
be found in the coefficients for the variable minority region, which indicate that respondents 
from a minority region are more likely to have a positive EU image than respondents from non-
minority regions, while being less likely to be relatively more satisfied with EU democracy than 
with democracy in their home country, all else equal. It is noteworthy that the coefficients on 
regional identity and minority region have the opposite signs in model two and three. A possible 
reason for this is that not everyone expressing a strong regional identity lives in a minority 
region, while not everyone living in a minority region has a strong regional identity. The 
interaction term, which captures the effects on the dependent variables by respondents that both 
have a strong regional identity and live in a minority region, confirms this suggestion. The 
findings indicate that respondents with these traits tend to be more satisfied with their country's 
EU membership than others, and the relationship has a relatively large magnitude, while being 
significant at the 1 percent level. Based on this last finding, the second null hypothesis can be 
rejected, although with some reservations. 
14 

[Table I about here] 
Whereas the results in Table I are useful for assessing the statistical significance and the 
positive or negative direction of the various effects, the magnitudes of the coefficients estimated 
with logistic models are due to the nonlinearity of the models not easily interpreted. A commonly 
suggested more direct approach for interpretation is to examine the predicted probabilities of an 
event for different values of the independent variables (Long 1997). First, Table 2 displays the 
predicted probabilities of the different levels of satisfaction EU membership, and the relative 
satisfaction with EU democracy, for each of groups of respondents living in states/regions with 
different levels of federalism. 
[Table 2 about here] 
These results confirm the patterns from Table I, suggesting that as the level of federalism 
increases, the probability of considering one's country's EU membership a good thing increases, 
while the probability of considering one's country's EU membership a bad thing decreases. 
Despite the steadiness of this trend, however, the differences between the two extremes of 
perfect centralism and perfect federalism are a mere 2.4 and 1.1 percentage points. Similarly, the 
results suggest that an increase in the level of federalism is resulting in a linear increase in the 
probability of being more satisfied with democracy in the EU than with democracy in one's 
home country, however once again with a very small actual change of 2.4 percentage points 
between the lowest and the highest level of federalism. 
The predicted probabilities of the dependent variables for respondents with different 
levels ofregional identity, and living in minority versus non-minority regions, displayed in Table 
3, also confirm the contradictory findings from Table I, while the differences between the 
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categories are greater than in Table 2. Most significantly, the probability of thinking that one's 
country's EU membership is a generally good thing is more than nine percentage points greater 
among respondents from minority regions whose regional attachment is stronger than the 
attachment to their country, than among other respondents. This corresponds to the large 
magnitude of the only statistically significant positive coefficient of this category, and suggests 
that this measure may in fact be the best proxy for the purpose of capturing the characteristics 
that the literature on pro-European minority nationalist regions is referring to. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Beside the effects of the key independent variables on EU attitudes, an interesting 
conclusion can be drawn about one of the control variables. All three models suggest a strong 
positive relationship between respondents' perceptions about their voice being heard in the EU 
(here referred to as representation), and satisfaction with their country's EU membership, a 
positive image of the EU, and a relatively greater satisfaction with EU democracy than with 
democracy in their home country, all else being equal. The predicted probability of considering 
one's country's EU membership a good thing is 77.8% among respondents who think that they 
have a voice in the EU, as compared to only 41.9% of respondents who do not feel that they have 
a voice in the EU. Similarly, the probability of having a very positive or fairly positive image of 
the EU is 68.4% among respondents who feel well represented, while only being 32.7% among 
those who do not feel well represented in Brussels. Even if these findings do not relate directly to 
the hypotheses tested in this paper, they are of great significance as evidence for the fact that 
there is indeed a strong relationship between citizens' sense of being well represented in the EU 
and their relative support for European integration. Simply put, representation in Brussels 
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matters for EU citizens, and the quality of this representation, in particular of the representation 
of regional interests, will be examined in the next part of this paper. 
Results II: The Quality of Regional Representation as a Cause of Variation in Euroskepticism 
This part of the paper will present some initial findings from the collection of data 
through forty interviews with the directors of regional representation offices in Brussels in May 
and June 2008. The interview data is very rich hut the scope of this paper does not allow for 
more elaborate analysis at this time. As mentioned in the data section cases from three EU 
member states were selected along two dimensions-one one hand to control for intstitutional 
factors, by choosing one federal, one semi-federal, and one unitary member state, and on the 
other hand to control for cultural factors, by choosing member states two out of three of which 
harbor minority nationalist regions. In the following, some of the patterns that have been 
identified so far will be presented briefly. 
Three general trends were identified, with similarities across virtually all forty regions 
that were part of the study. First, regarding the question of whether the regions actually have any 
influence over EU legislation, the interviewees overwhelmingly feel that this is the case, and 
many provided concrete examples of this. With the exception of some of the largest and most 
influential regions, however, most interviewees added that you cannot achieve anything alone, 
and that one of the most important strategies to achieve influence over legislation is to team up 
with other regions. In fact, one of the most surprising overall findings of the interviews was the 
density of the system of cross-regional co-operation and networks that have developed in 
Brussels over the past decade. Another interesting finding was that virtually all interviewees feel 
that their region's presence in Brussels can contribute to the representation of interests unique to 
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their region in ways that the Permanent Representations (representing the member state 
govermnents in the Council) from their countries cannot. A slightly different pattern 
characterized the German regions, however, as all of the interviewees pointed out that they had a 
complementary representative role rather than a competitive one in relation to the Permanent 
Representation. Likewise, some of the regions with a stronger regional identity deviated from the 
general pattern by expressing a more independent representational role beside their Permanent 
Representations. These patterns were supported by different levels and frequencies of 
cooperation between the regional offices and the Permanent Representations. Finally, virtually 
all the regions focus their lobbying-although some of them were resistant to using this term, the 
description of what they do clearly indicated that it is lobbying-on the same two EU 
institutions: the Commission and the Parliament. The only exceptions were, once again, some 
strong identity regions from Germany and the UK, which included the Council in either first or 
second place. Interestingly, but maybe not surprisingly, only one single interviewee mentioned 
the Committee of the Regions, and when asked about it, others stated quite blatantly that it is not 
important, because it does not have any real decision-making power. 
In addition to these general trends of relative similarities across regions, a few patterns of 
striking differences among regions were identified. Relevant for the research questions asked in 
this paper, although regions feel that they represent their constituents, this cannot be expected to 
automatically lead to greater citizen satisfaction with European integration. Rather, to contribute 
to more positive attitudes towards European integration, the regional goals achieved in Brussels 
must be communicated to the constituents at home. There is if fact great variation in the extent to 
which the regional offices do this, or even think that it is their task to do this. Some regions go as 
far as putting up signs at public places that were built with the help of EU funds, while others 
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admit that the regional elites back home like to take the credit for these achievements without 
necessarily mentioning that they were made possible thanks to the EU. Although most 
interviewees agree that it is an important task of theirs to bring Europe closer to the elites at 
home (often by bringing these elites to Brussels), some believe that it is then the elites' choice 
whether or not to "market" the EU at home, while others actively pursue this goal on their own. 
Conclusion 
When interpreting the results of the quantitative analysis displayed in Tables I through 3, 
it is important to keep in mind that the shown effects of the independent variables on the three 
dependent variables representing EU-attitudes should not be interpreted as causal, but rather as 
mere associations, mainly due to the possible existence of confounding variables. One possible 
omitted variable that may confound the results is the household income, which was excluded 
from the analysis due to the low response rate, although the education variable at the individual 
level probably captures some of the same effects. Another set of variables that might have 
contributed to increasing the explanatory power of the model are regional level socioeconomic 
variables, such as the economic wealth of the regions, the annual economic growth of the 
regions, the unemployment rates in the regions, and the inflow into the regions of financial 
support from the EU through the regional/structural funds. The use of such aggregate level 
regional data may be more suitable for an analysis at the aggregate, rather than the individual 
leveL 
Conducting multiple regression analysis using variables that have not been analyzed in a 
similar manner in earlier research poses specific difficulties, since there are no precedents as to 
how to build the regression models. Thus, one of the most immediate suggestions for future 
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research is to utilize quantitative analysis to a larger extent when examining questions like the 
ones posed in this paper, extending the knowledge of what factors are associated with support for 
European integration. Considering the failed ratification process of the Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, the currently frozen ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty, as well as 
the consistently declining turnout rates in EP elections, citizen support for the EU is of utmost 
importance to its legitimacy. These circumstances thus indicate a vast practical value for future 
analyses of questions like the ones posed in this paper. The evidence of variation in 
Euroskepticism at the regional level provided in this paper, along with the indications of the 
increasing importance of regional actors in Brussels provided by the interviews and other data, 
should also be seen as a prompt to conduct further analysis of the connection between regional 
representation and Euroskepticism. Yet another suggestion for future research is to compare the 
relationship between regional minority nationalism and support for European integration over 
time, adding a time-series component to the analysis. Although such an analysis could provide 
additional knowledge of the change in this relationship, and thus enhance the possibility of 
finding causal relationships, the largest problem with such an analysis would yet again be the 
limited availability of data, since the consecutive survey results are not based on panel surveys 
and since some of the survey questions are not repeatedly asked. 
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Results of regression analyses (robust standard errors in parentheses) 
Model] Model2 Model3 
Relative 
Satisfaction with Satisfaction with 
EU Membership EUimage EU Democracy 
Federalism 0.010 (0.005)* 0.007 (0.004) 0.039 (0.008)*** 
Regional Identity -0.291 (0.062)*** -0.304(0.060)*** 0.328 (0.103)** 
Representation 0. 790 (0.0 19)*** 0.746 (0.017)*** 0.104 (0.032)** 
Minority Region 0.070 (0.047) 0.082 (0.040)* -0.224 (0.085)** 
Regional ID x Minority Region 0.395 (0.116)** 0.147 (0.099) -0.016 (0.189) 
Male 0.233 (0.034)*** 0.120 (0.031 )*** 0.040 (0.061) 
Age -0.010 (0.001)*** -0.012 (0.001)*** -0.006 (0.002)*** 
Education 0.030 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.003) -0.032 (0.007)*** 
Constant -1.665 (0.177)*** 
Log (Pseudo-)Likelihood -13,004.42 -18,793.92 -3,975.43 
i /Wald i 2,016.28 2,165.67 96.33 
Pseudo R2 0.0808 0.0577 O.oJ15 
Percent Correctly Predicted 58.3% 45.4% 90.8% 
N 14,704 14,839 13,131 
Notes: *Significant at the 0.05level; **Significant at the 0.01 level; ***Significant at the 0.001level. 
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Table 2: Predicted probabilities by Federalism Status for the Ordered Logit and Logistic 
Models 
Generally Neither Generally 
Satisfaction with EU membership good good nor bad bad 
Federal score= 0 (least federal) (N=4,366) 57.7% 29.3% 13.0% 
Federal score= I (N=2,704) 57.9% 29.2% 12.9% 
Federal score = 3 (N=998) 58.4% 28.9% 12.7% 
Federal score= 4 (N=990) 58.6% 28.8% 12.6% 
Federal score= 5 (N=375) 58.9% 28.7% 12.5% 
Federal score= 6 (N=J,600) 59.1% 28.5% 12.4% 
Federal score = 7 (N=246) 59.4% 28.4% 12.2% 
Federal score= 8 (N=J ,993) 59.6% 28.3% 12.1% 
Federal score= 10 (most federal) (N=J,492) 60.1% 28.0% 11.9% 
Relative satisfaction with EU democracy More Not more 
satisfied satisfied 
Federal score= 0 (least federal) (N=3,887) 7.8% 92.2% 
Federal score= I (N=2,325) 8.1% 91.9% 
Federal score = 3 (N=907) 8.7% 91.3% 
Federal score= 4 (N=860) 9.0% 91.0% 
Federal score= 5 (N=271) 9.3% 90.7% 
Federal score= 6 (N=J,428) 9.6% 90.4% 
Federal score= 7 (N=J 99) 10.0% 90.0% 
Federal score= 8 (N=J ,895) 10.3% 89.7% 
Federal score= 10 (most federal) (N=J,359) 11.1% 88.9% 
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Table 3: Predicted probabilities by Regional Identity and Minority Region Status for the 
Ordered Logit and Logistic Models 
Generally Neither Generally 
Satisfaction with EU membership good good nor bad bad 
Strong regional identity (N=l,723) 52.2% 32.1% 15.7% 
Weak regional identity (N= 12,981) 59.4% 28.4% 12.2% 
Minority region+ strong regional ID (N=603) 67.3% 23.7% 9.0% 
Other regions (N=14,101) 58.2% 29.1% 12.8% 
Very or fairly Fairly or 
EU image positive Neutral very negative 
Strong regional identity (N= 1. 73 7) 41.1% 39.3% 19.5% 
Weak regional identity (N=l3,102) 48.7% 36.2% 15.2% 
Minority region (N=3,262) 49.4% 35.8% 14.8% 
Non-minority region (N=11,577) 47.3% 36.8% 15.9% 
More Not more 
Relative satisfaction with EU democracy satisfied satisfied 
Strong regional identity (N= 1 ,535) 11.5% 88.5% 
Weak regional identity (N=l1,596) 8.6% 91.4% 
Minority region (N=2,884) 7.6% 92.4% 
Non-minority region (N=10,247) 9.3% 90.7% 
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Appendix A 
The Cleaning of the Survey Analysis Sample from Eurobarometer 65.2 (2006) 
Cleaning step 
Original sample size 
NotEU15 
EUI5 sample size 
No region stated 
N 
29,170 
-13,722 
15,448 
-45 
Missing values on other independent variables 
Missing values on DV SatEUMem 
-201 
-498 
Analysis sample size DV SatEUMem 
Missing values on DV EUimage 
Analysis sample size DV EUimage 
Missing values on DV SatEUDem 
Analysis sample size DV SatEUDem 
14,704 
-363 
14,839 
-2,071 
13,131 
Appendix B 
Descriptive Statistics of the Analysis Sample 
Variable N Mean 
Satisfaction with EU Membership 14,704 1.4185 
EU Image 14,839 2.3450 
Relative satisfaction with EU democracy 13,131 0.0916 
Federalism 15,403 3.6278 
Regional identity 15,403 0.1158 
Representation 15,403 0.8430 
Minority region 15,403 0.2090 
Sex 15,403 0.4548 
Age 15,403 48.0701 
Education 15,202 18.4727 
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Std. Dev. Min 
0.7412 0 
0.9526 0 
0.2885 0 
3.5535 0 
0.3199 0 
0.9440 0 
0.4066 0 
0.4980 0 
18.1892 15 
5.7741 0 
Max 
2 
4 
1 
10 
I 
2 
I 
I 
95 
70 

Appendix C 
Eurobarometer 65.2: Variables and questions 
QAlla 
QA13 
Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the 
European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? 
In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image? 
QA15a 4 Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree: "My 
voice counts in the European Union." 
QA34a On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not 
at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)? 
QA34b And how about the way democracy works in the European Union? 
QA35 _ 2 People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their 
region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to ... your 
regwn. 
QA35 3 People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or viiiage, to their 
region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to ... 
(OUR COUNTRY). 
D8 How old were you when you stopped full-time education? 
DlO [Gender] 
Dll How old are you? 
P7 [Region] 
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AppendixD 
Interviews with directors of regional offices in Brussels: Interview questions 
A. General questions 
I. When did [this region] open an office here in Brussels? 
2. Why was this office established at that particular time? 
3. At that time, to what extent do you think that institutional developments within the 
EC/EU affected the incentives for your region to open an office in Brussels? 
4. Can you provide some basic information about the resources of the office: 
a. What is the number of staff? 
b. What is currently the size of the annual budget? 
c. Beside staff and budget resources, what types of resources are important for 
the operations of this office? 
B. Purpose/policy orientation 
5. What do you perceive as being the main purpose of[this region's] presence in Brussels? 
What are some secondary purposes? 
6. What influence do you perceive that you have on EU legislation through the activities of 
this office? 
7. What influence do you perceive that this office has on the allocation of funds to the 
regions through the Cohesion Policy? 
8. What kinds of strategies do you employ to achieve this influence? 
9. [Ask only NUTS2-level regions!] Considering that [this region] is part of a NUTS!-
region, which also has an office here in Brussels, do you think that [this office] performs 
any functions that the higher level office does not? Please elaborate. 
10. Similarly, do you think that this office perfonns any functions that the UK Permanent 
Representation and the UK government do not perform? Please elaborate. 
11. Has your office focused on any particular policy areas in the past six months? If so, what 
policy areas? 
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12. How about in the past five years? 
13. How and by whom is this office instructed on what policy issues to focus on? 
C. Effects of enlargement I the Lisbon Agenda 
14. How did the 2004 enlargement affect your goals and your strategies to achieve these 
goals? 
15. How has the Lisbon Agenda, with its focus on competitiveness, growth, and job creation, 
affected your region, and in particular the allocation of funds to your region? 
16. How have your priorities changed as a result of the Lisbon Agenda? 
D. Interaction with EU institutions and other regional offices and organizations 
17. Which EU institutions does this office interact with most frequently? With what 
purposes? 
[If not volunteered, ask about the interaction with:] 
Commission (specific DGs?) 
EP (specific Committees?) 
MEPs from [this region] 
Council (and COREPER) 
CoR 
18. To what extent does this office cooperate with other regional offices to achieve its goals? 
What is the type and depth of this cooperation? Does it focus on specific issues? 
19. Do you see this region as competing with other regions for regional funds? If so, is it 
competing primarily with other British regions, or with other regions within the EU 
overall? 
20. To what extent does this office participate in the activities oftrans-regional organizations 
to achieve its goals? 
21. To what extent does this office cooperate with the UK Permanent Representation to 
achieve its goals? 
22. To what extent does this office cooperate with nongovernmental organizations from your 
region to achieve its goals? 
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E. Constituency linkage/representation 
23. If you consider this office to have a representative role, whose interests does it represent? 
24. To what extent and by what means does this office communicate directly with its 
constituents in [this region]? (for example through direct mail or rallies) 
25. To what extent and by what means does this office communicate indirectly with its 
constituents in [this region)? (for example through the media) 
26. To what extent does this office attempt to communicate its policy achievements to the 
constituents in [this region]? 
27. To what extent does this office attempt to increase the awareness of EU politics in [this 
region]? 
28. Has the institutional development of the EU contributed to better representation of 
citizens from [this region] today? What could be better? 
29. Does this office contribute significantly to better representation of citizens from [this 
region)? How? 
F. Concluding questions 
30. Do you generally feel that [your region] has benefitted from the UK's EU membership? 
If no, why not? If yes, in what ways? 
31. Do you generally feel that [your region J has become a more powerful political actor vis-
it-vis the UK within the EU governance system? How so? 
32 

